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Short-Sale Constraints and the Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle:
An Event Study Approach
Abstract
Using event studies, we show that short-sale constraints play an important role in the neg-
ative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. We explore three exogenous
events that change short-sale constraints: the IPO lockup period expiration, option introduc-
tion, and the recent short-selling ban on financial stocks. Following mitigation of short-sale
constraints from the first two events, high idiosyncratic volatility stocks underperform low
volatility stocks in the short and long run, and are associated with higher abnormal trading
volume. Additionally, highly volatile financial firms experience greater price increases upon
the short-sale ban enforcement and greater price drops upon the ban expiration.
[Keywords] Idiosyncratic Volatility, Short-Sale Constraints, IPO Lockup, Option Introduc-
tion, Short-Sale Ban
[JEL Classification] G12, G14, G18
1 Introduction
Traditional asset pricing theories predict that idiosyncratic risk should be either unpriced if
it can be diversified away or positively priced if it is undiversifiable (Sharpe 1964, Merton
1987).1 Recently, however, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) document a strong nega-
tive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns, posing an interesting puzzle
to traditional pricing theories.
One possible explanation is that high idiosyncratic volatility reflects strongly divergent
beliefs of investors and noise trading, leading to stock overpricing when short sale constraints
are binding (Miller 1977, Chen, Hong, and Stein 2002, Scheinkman and Xiong 2003). Consis-
tent with this explanation, there is evidence that this negative volatility-return relation ap-
pears only among firms with large proportions of retail trading (noise) (Han and Kumar 2008)
and only among those subject to binding short sale constraints (Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar,
and Sorescu 2006, Duan, Hu, and McLean 2007). In particular, since short-sale constraints
more likely bind for highly volatile (usually low-price and small) stocks, this negative rela-
tion is further strengthened. Therefore, it is crucial to understand to what extent short-sale
constraints contribute to the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle.
Short sale constraints, in a broad sense, involve various limitations, costs, and risks
of selling short (Lamont 2004). Theoretical work commonly models short-sale constraints
as the limited ability of investors to sell short due to legal or institutional restrictions
(Miller 1977, Harrison and Kreps 1978, Diamond and Verrecchia 1987, Chen, Hong, and
Stein 2002, Bai, Chang, and Wang 2006, Xu 2007).2 Empirical studies about idiosyncratic
volatility, instead, mainly look for patterns of the volatility-return relation, conditioning on
proxies for costs or degrees of difficulty to sell short. These proxies include, for example,
firm size, institutional ownership, short interest ratios, and costs of borrowing stocks (loan
1Other models predicting a positive relation between returns and idiosyncratic risk include those derived
by Barberis and Huang (2001), Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), and Malkiel and Xu (2006).
2These model all assume that investors are banned from or have limitations on selling short.
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fees).3 However, these short-sale-constraint measures are also proxies for liquidity, investor
sophistication, and shorting demand (stock overpricing).4 As a result, findings based on
these measures are often subject to multiple interpretations,5 and accordingly, the extent to
which short-sale constraints contribute to overpricing of high idiosyncratic volatility stocks
remains inconclusive.
This paper attacks this issue using an event study approach. We analyze how exoge-
nous shocks that mitigate or strengthen short-sale constraints affect the relation between
idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. Specifically, we study three events: the expira-
tion of the IPO lockup period, the introduction of tradable options, and the imposition and
expiration of explicit bans on short sales in September and October of 2008. Since these
events mainly involve changes in regulations or institutional setups for restrictions in di-
rect or indirect (short) selling, the short-term price reactions at the time of these events
provide clean measures of the pricing effect of short-sale constraints as described in asset
pricing models. Therefore, we can directly test the role of short-sale constraints in pricing
idiosyncratic volatility.
During the IPO lock-up period, insiders and other pre-IPO stockholders typically cannot
sell their shares for six months (Bradley, Jordan, Yi, and Roten 2001). The inability to sell
owned shares is deemed the most stringent short-sale constraint (Ofek and Richardson 2003).
Upon the IPO lockup expiration, investors are allowed to sell the locked-up shares and
impound their negative information into the price. On the other hand, locked-up shares
become lendable, making short-selling more feasible and less costly. Thus, the IPO lock-up
period expiration introduces shocks to mitigate the constraints on selling short (Ofek and
3See Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and Sorescu (2006) and Duan, Hu, and McLean (2007).
4For instance, both the short interest ratio and the loan fee also capture investor demand to sell short
the stocks (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005, Cohen, Diether, and Malloy 2007). Institutional ownership
is not only a proxy for lendable shares (Nagel 2005), but is also a proxy for investor sophistication (Jiang,
Xu, and Yao 2007) or informed institutional trading (Duan, Hu, and McLean 2007). Firm size is related to
shorting costs as well as liquidity and information asymmetry.
5For instance, several papers find that the negative volatility-return relation is stronger among firms
with low institutional ownership. However, Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2007) use institutional ownership to proxy
for investor sophistication. Duan, Hu, and McLean (2007) use it to indicate informed/uninformed trading.
Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and Sorescu (2006) use it for firm visibility and investor recognition.
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Richardson 2003, Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong 2006).
Option introductions provide another way to loosen short-sale constraints. Upon the
introduction of tradable options, investors who face difficulty selling short underlying stocks
can now alternatively sell short synthetically through the option markets (Figlewski and
Webb 1993, Danielsen and Sorescu 2001). Such positions involve selling calls and buy-
ing puts, prompting market makers (who are commonly the counterparty) to hedge their
positions through selling short the underlying security. Since market makers face fewer
short selling constraints than regular retail/institutional investors (Evans, Geczy, Musto,
and Reed 2008), the availability of tradable options effectively mitigates short sale con-
straints in the equity market. If high idiosyncratic volatility stocks are more overpriced, we
expect them to experience more negative price reactions than less volatile stocks upon these
two events as a result of mitigation of short-sale constraints.
Our results provide strong support for these hypotheses. Over the period 1988–2007,
during a 21-day window surrounding the expiration of the lockup period, the value-weighted
highest idiosyncratic volatility quintile of IPOs underperforms the lowest quintile by 13.09%.
Over the period 1996–2006, for 61 days following the introduction of tradable options the
value-weighted relative underperformance is 11.73%. The return patterns hold for alternative
short-term event windows, alternative benchmark returns, and persist for 12 through 36
months after the events.6 The effects are weaker for equal-weighted returns, which reflects
the pattern documented by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) that value-weighted
volatile stocks underperform the most. In addition, for 21 days surrounding the event day,
value-weighted highly volatile IPOs experience over two times the abnormal trading volume
of less volatile stocks. For 61 days following option introduction, newly-introduced options
for highly volatile stocks have relative volume almost eight times more than less volatile
stocks.7 Evidence from both returns and trading volume is consistent with the notion that
6We do not attribute the long-term price correction to the loosening of short-sale constraints. As suggested
by Loughran and Ritter (1997), among others, the long-term abnormal returns are likely caused by the
revelation of fundamentals that force optimistic investors to correct their beliefs.
7The relative volume is the volume of newly-introduced options on event stocks relative to the volume of
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highly volatile, particularly big-cap, stocks are more overpriced at the time of the event, and
this overpricing is partly caused by short-sale constraints impeding rational arbitrage.
The third event we study is the recent ban on short selling financial stocks amid the credit
crisis in September and October, 2008. The pressure on financial stocks due to the excess
leverage in credit positions during the subprime/housing market collapse led to significant
price declines in these stocks. Before the implementation of the short-sale restriction around
mid September, the financial sector had declined by over 35% for the year.8 Over this
period there were significant short positions taken in these stocks. Thus, the temporary
short-sale ban on these financial stocks provides a natural experiment to test whether short
sellers targeted and had a stronger price impact on more volatile (and thus more overpriced)
financial firms. When the short-sale ban is enforced, short-sellers are forced to cover their
short positions, which can drive up the prices of the “no-short” stocks in the face of a
downward-sloping demand curve. If highly volatile stocks are more overpriced and thus more
heavily shorted, then we expect their price appreciation to be greater due to the removal of
more short sales from the market. In contrast, when the ban expires, we expect those short
sellers to re-establish their short positions, pushing prices down, particularly among more
overpriced high volatility stocks.
Consistent with our hypothesis, surrounding the enforcement of the ban, the value-
weighted two-day returns of these “no-short” stocks (excluding low-price, thinly-traded
stocks) is positive, 17.16%. Upon the expiration of the ban, the value-weighted daily re-
turn of the “no-short” stocks is negative, −5.12%. Furthermore, compared to the lowest
idiosyncratic volatility quintile, the highest quintile responds 8.81%–14.08% more positively
to the ban enforcement, and 0.22%–4.65% more negatively to the ban expiration. In addition,
we show that short positions, as measured by short interest ratios, are indeed significantly
greater among highly volatile financial stocks than less volatile ones before and after the ban
period. Consistent with our earlier results, the results are all stronger among value-weighted
existing options on matched stocks with similar idiosyncratic volatility.
8Based on the year-to-date return of the XLF financial sector ETF.
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returns. Taken together, our evidence provides strong support for short sellers having a
substantial impact on the pricing of highly volatile stocks.
Previous literature (Field and Hanka 2001, Bradley, Jordan, Yi, and Roten 2001, Brav
and Gompers 2003) documents negative abnormal returns and positive abnormal volume
associated with IPOs upon the lockup expiration. We add to this research by showing
that these negative price reactions are much stronger among firms with high idiosyncratic
volatility, where the value-weighted negative price responses are one to three times larger.
Our option introduction results also contribute to the debate about whether these events
depress stock prices (Danielsen and Sorescu 2001, Mayhew and Mihov 2005, Blau 2008).
We show that the negative price reaction, although insignificant for stocks in general, is
fairly robust among those with high idiosyncratic volatility where they are three to fourteen
times greater. Therefore, the reduction of short-sale constraints upon option introductions is
substantial among highly overpriced securities. Moreover, after conditioning on idiosyncratic
volatility, we show that the alphas of the trading strategies are improved by two to nine times
based on the long-term performance following IPOs and option introductions. Therefore, our
findings carry important practical implications.
This study is developed in the following sections. Section 2 presents the motivational
literature and develops hypotheses. Data are described in Section 3. We provide the results
from our empirical tests in Section 4. Section 5 contains a summary and conclusion.
2 Motivation and Hypotheses
2.1 The idiosyncratic volatility puzzle
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) show that, with value weighting, a portfolio of low
idiosyncratic stocks outperforms a portfolio of high idiosyncratic stocks by around 1% per
month over the period 1963–2000, and that this finding cannot be explained by numerous
firm-specific and macro-economic factors. They measure idiosyncratic volatility as the stan-
dard deviation of the residual returns from the regression of daily security returns within a
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month on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and examine the cross-sectional
return patterns in the subsequent months. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) show that
the underperformance of highly volatile stocks is a common phenomenon worldwide. The
negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns is at odds with traditional
asset pricing theory. As Ang et al. state, “our results on idiosyncratic volatility represent a
substantive puzzle.”
Several studies respond to the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. Using alternative measures
of firm-specific volatility, Malkiel and Xu (2006), Spiegel and Wang (2006), Chua, Goh, and
Zhang (2007), and Diavatopoulos, Doran, and Peterson (2008), and Fu (2009) find a positive
relation between stock returns and alternative measures of idiosyncratic volatility.9 These
authors suggest that the measure of idiosyncratic volatility employed by Ang et al. (2006)
may not adequately capture the expected idiosyncratic risk and, hence, Ang et al.’s results
do not cause rejection of rational asset pricing models.
Some evidence suggests that the findings of Ang et al. (2006) do not hold for equal-
weighted portfolio returns (Bali and Cakici 2007) and may be driven by the short-term
reversal effect (Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang 2006). Doran, Jiang, and Peterson (2008),
however, show that once January is excluded, the negative volatility-return relation is fairly
robust. This is because high idiosyncratic volatility stocks, particularly the small ones, earn
abnormally high returns in January.
Nevertheless, the empirical findings of Ang et al. (2006, 2009) represent a trading strategy
with abnormal returns, leading subsequent studies to focus on explaining why high volatility
stocks earn abysmal returns. Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2007) suggest that the underperformance
of highly volatile stocks is caused by the adverse selection of firms with poor future earnings.
These firms tend to disclose less information, creating greater idiosyncratic volatility in
9Malkiel and Xu (2006) use size and beta sorted portfolios to estimate idiosyncratic volatility. Spiegel
and Wang (2006) estimate it using E-GARCH models. Fu (2009) estimates the expected idiosyncratic
volatility from exponential GARCH models. Chua, Goh, and Zhang (2007) find the expected component
of idiosyncratic volatility, and Diavatopoulos, Doran, and Peterson (2008) estimate idiosyncratic volatility
from the implied volatility of options.
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returns. Kapadia (2006) and Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2008) find that the negative
relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns is largely driven by a negative relation
between skewness and returns.
Han and Kumar (2008) find that the negative volatility-return relation is only present
among stocks actively traded by retail investors. Since retail investors are more likely to
be uninformed and subject to behavioral biases, their evidence suggests that noise trading,
defined as trading by uninformed investors acting as if they were given genuine information,
plays an important role in this puzzle. Studies that involve short-sale constraints show that
high idiosyncratic volatility predicts low returns only among highly shorted stocks (Duan,
Hu, and McLean 2007), or highly shorted, but less visible, firms (Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar,
and Sorescu 2006).
2.2 Heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints
Several models suggest that idiosyncratic volatility is a proxy for investor disagreement and
noise (overconfidence) trading. Miller (1977, 2001) suggests that volatility, or uncertainty
about firm fundamentals, is positively correlated with investor differences of opinions. De-
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) show that noise trading produces excess
volatility in stock markets. Behavioral models based on investor overconfidence by Odean
(1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
also predict excess price volatility due to investor overconfidence, which is defined as investors
overestimating the precision of cash flow signals. In these models, return volatility represents
both cash flow volatility and the amount of noise (overconfidence) trading. The greater the
volatility, the larger the asset mispricing (both underpricing and overpricing). Barberis and
Xiong (2008) posit that investors experience positive utility when realizing trading gains,
and thus are attracted to high volatility securities, causing overpricing and subsequent low
returns on these securties.
When excess volatility, driven by divergence of opinion or noise trading, is further com-
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bined with short-sale constraints, securities will on average be overvalued. For instance,
in the model by Miller (1977), when short-sale constraints are binding, stock prices only
reflect the beliefs of the optimistic investors and, hence, deviate above their fundamental
values. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) illustrate that, with short-sale constraints, heteroge-
neous beliefs due to overconfidence create an opportunity to sell at a higher price to others
in the future. Therefore, investors are willing to pay more for shares, generating a price
bubble. Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) further show that when short-sale constraints
are mitigated, such as when there is an increase in floating assets, a market bubble can burst.
In these models short-sale constraints contribute to the upward bias in price that leads to
low subsequent returns; mitigation of short-sale constraints can trigger the downward price
adjustments to fundamentals.
2.3 Events that change short-sale constraints
The expiration of the IPO lockup period is a loosening of short-sale constraints. A share
lockup represents the “most stringent form of short sale constraint” (Ofek and Richardson
2003), where insiders are not allowed to sell. Ofek and Richardson posit that the bursting of
the Internet bubbles in late 1990’s and 2000 are largely triggered by the expiration of large
blocks of locked-up shares after the spring of 2000.10 The model by Hong, Scheinkman, and
Xiong (2006) further shows that an increase in floating assets, such as at the end of an IPO
lockup, can cause price depreciation when pessimistic investors are able to sell. IPO evidence
(Field and Hanka 2001, Bradley, Jordan, Yi, and Roten 2001, Brav and Gompers 2003)
documents an average −1% to −2% cumulative abnormal return and 40% abnormal volume
during short windows upon the IPO unlock-up.
In our setting, if highly volatile stocks are more overpriced and the demand curve for
shares is downward sloping, the selling of insider shares should drive down the price more
for highly volatile stocks.11 Moreover, if insider selling occurs in a large amount upon the
10Battalio and Schultz (2006), however, suggest that short-sale constraints are not binding for the internet
stocks in early 2000.
11Our tests only identify whether short-sale constraints make overpricing worse, but not whether short-sale
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expiration date, we expect that trading volume to be even greater among high volatility
IPOs than low volatility ones.
Empirical studies find that the introduction of options helps mitigate short-sale con-
straints.12 For instance, option introductions tends to depress stock prices after 1981 (Sorescu
2000), are associated with increased short selling of underlying stocks (Figlewski and Webb
1993), and are linked to the extent to which stock price drops are related to contemporaneous
increases in short interest (Danielsen and Sorescu 2001). With tradable options, short-sellers
can establish synthetic short positions by selling calls and/or buying puts, forcing option
market makers to hedge their positions through short sales of underlying securities. Options
market makers are effectively allowed to sell short without borrowing the stock, and are thus
important short sellers of hard-to-borrow stocks, driving down stock prices (Evans, Geczy,
Musto, and Reed 2008). Thus, other things equal, optionable stocks should suffer less from
short-sale constraints than non-optionable stocks. In our setting, we expect highly volatile
stocks to experience greater price reductions from the mitigation of short-sale constraints
upon option introduction. Moreover, since synthetic short selling involves trading both calls
and puts, we expect the option volume following option introduction to be greater among
highly volatile stocks.
We do not, however, expect all overpricing to be corrected immediately after the mitiga-
tion (not elimination) of short-sale constraints for at least two reasons. First, there are other
forms of impediments to arbitrage, such as agency problems, holding costs of short positions,
and noise trader risk (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). When arbitrage in general is limited, the
full correction of mispricing demands irrational investors adjusting their beliefs in the face of
substantive information about firm fundamentals, which takes time to reveal. Second, even
when arbitrage has no limitations, average investors can have biased beliefs. When rational
investors are risk averse as well, asset price reflects this average belief (Daniel, Hirshleifer,
constraints cause overpricing. Thus, the premise does not contradict to the argument of Battalio and Schultz
(2006).
12Mayhew and Mihov (2005) and Blau (2008), however, find no consistent evidence that short-sale con-
straints are alleviated through option trading upon option introduction.
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and Subrahmanyam 2001). As a result, highly volatile stocks can still be overpriced, and
this overpricing will only correct itself in the long run with the revelation of fundamentals.
Thus, we hypothesize that the price correction process occurs both in the short and long
run.
The most explicit form of short-sale constraints is a short-sale ban. The recent short-sale
ban amid the financial turmoil in September and October of 2008 provides an interesting
setting to study the overpricing of high idiosyncratic volatility. On the September 17th,
the SEC issued an order (Release No. 34-58572) limiting the activity of naked short sales,
and it became effective on Thursday, September 18th at 12:01 am.13 The SEC stated, “we
are concerned about the possible unnecessary or artificial price movements based on un-
founded rumors regarding the stability of financial institutions and other issuers exacerbated
by ‘naked’ short selling.” On September 18th, the Financial Services Authority of the UK
then imposed a ban on short-selling all United Kingdom financial stocks (Reference number
FSA/PN/102/2008).14 On that same day, US regulators followed suit and issued, after the
closing bell, an emergency order (RELEASE NO. 34-58592) that prohibited short sales for
799 securities (mostly financial stocks).15 Consequently, all individual investors were pro-
hibited from short selling the stock of any financial firm and certain institutional investment
managers were required to report short positions. The ban was in effect through October
8th and lifted at the opening bell on October 9th. After the ban is enforced, we expect
short sellers to be forced to cover their short positions, elevating prices, especially on highly
volatile stocks. After the ban expires, we expect the opposite to happen; short sellers take
new positions and drive down prices, again most strongly among highly volatile stocks. As
evidence of short sellers targeting highly volatile stocks, we expect that highly volatile stocks
should have a greater short interest ratio (the number of shares shorted as a percentage of
shares outstanding) than less volatile stocks prior to and after the ban.
13See http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58572.pdf
14See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2008/102.shtml.
15See http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58592.pdf.
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2.4 Hypotheses
To summarize, based on prior theoretical and empirical work, we develop the following three
hypotheses:
H1: High idiosyncratic volatility stocks underperform their counterparts upon and fol-
lowing IPO lockup expiration and option introduction.
H2: High idiosyncratic volatility stocks are traded more around IPO lockup expirations,
and the newly-introduced options on highly volatile stocks are traded more than those on
less volatile stocks.
H3: High idiosyncratic volatility stocks outperform their counterparts upon enforcing the
short-sale ban but underperform when the ban expires. High idiosyncratic volatility stocks
are more heavily shorted (have higher short interest ratios) than low idiosyncratic volatility
stocks prior to the ban enforcement and after the ban expiration.
3 Data
Our main sample includes all common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) listed on the NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq from July 1963 through December 2007. Stock returns and other stock
trading data are obtained from the Center of Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). The book
value of equity is from COMPUSTAT. The Fama-French factor returns are from Kenneth
French’s website.
Following Ang et al. (2006), we define the idiosyncratic volatility of a firm (IVOL) as
the standard deviation of its daily residual returns from the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model, and we require at least 17 valid daily returns in a month to include the firm in
the analysis for that month. Following Fama and French (1992), we define book-to-market
equity (BM), used from July of year t to June of year t+1, as the ratio of book equity as of
December year t− 1 over market equity (ME) at the end of December of year t− 1. ME is
the product of the stock price and shares outstanding. Share turnover (TURN) is the total
11
trading volume over a month divided by shares outstanding at the end of the month.16
Following Ofek and Richardson (2003), the event time of the expiration of the IPO lockup
period is defined as the number of lockup days after the offer day of the IPO. We obtain
5389 IPOs with lockup expiration dates from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global
New Issues dataset over the period 1988—2007.17 Among these IPOs, we identify 4128 event
firms that have available monthly returns during the expiration month of the IPO lockup
period in our sample. The lockup expiration date is defined as the IPO offer date plus the
number of lockup days. Field and Hanka (2001) report that the error rate of the lockup days
from SDC is modest at 3%. Thus, the lockup expiration date is considerably reliable.
Option data from 1996 through 2007 are obtained from OptionMetrics. The event day of
option introductions is defined as the day when options of an underlying stock first appear
in the OptionMetrics database. We require the event stock to have returns in our main
sample at the month of the option introduction. The final sample contains 3034 option
introductions.
Stock trading data from August through October, 2008, are collected from finance.yahoo.com
and money.msn.com. Short interest and shares outstanding are obtained from ShortSqueeze.com,
which is a private company that provides short interest data for all publicly traded stocks in
the US. The stock tickers in the “no-short” list are from SEC release NO. 34-58592. There
are 799 financial firms on the list. We exclude firms with stock prices less than $2.50, and
firms with less than 1000 shares traded in each of the three event days (September 18, 19,
and October 9) to avoid excess impacts from market microstructure issues, such as the bid-
ask spread.18 In addition, we exclude firms that are (1) on the list of REG 25 (Release
No. 58190), which was issued on July 18th, 2008, and enforced stringent rules on the short
sales on 20 prominent financial stocks,19 (2) involved in government bailouts or mergers and
16To account for the double counting problem with NASDAQ firms (e.g., Atkins and Dyl (1997)), their
trading volume reported in CRSP is divided by two.
17The lockup period data are available on SDC beginning in 1988.
18Changing the criteria on stock prices and trading volume can sometimes strengthen the results for
equal-weighted returns upon the ban expiration, but has relatively small impacts on value-weighted returns.
19See http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58190.pdf.
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acquisitions, including Wachovia (WB), Washington Mutual (WM), and AIG, and (3) ex-
plicitly petitioned to be removed from the ban list.20. The purpose is to identify a sample
of firms that are not impacted by firm-specific regulatory events other than the short-sale
ban issued on September 18. But keeping those firms in the sample does not qualitatively
change our results. Our final sample includes 542 stocks.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
We report the summary statistics of firm characteristics in Panel A of Table 1. For the
full sample of firms, idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is on average 3.52% per day, or 55.88%
per annum. It is higher in more recent years and for the IPO and option samples. The full
sample is also smaller and has a lower book-to-market ratio than the more recent samples,
including IPOs and new-optionable firms. Panel B reports the distribution of the number of
IPO lockup days for the IPO sample. The lockup periods range from 90 to 1095 days, with
an average of 210 days and a median of 180 days. These numbers are consistent with prior
research (e.g., Bradley, Jordan, Yi, and Roten (2001)).
4 Results
In this section we first replicate prior results showing that the stocks with the highest idiosyn-
cratic volatility underperform low volatility stocks only when portfolios are value-weighted.
We then test the three hypotheses developed in Section 2 and demonstrate how short-sale
constraints affect the negative volatility return-relation.
4.1 Portfolio returns and idiosyncratic volatility
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Each month we sort stocks based on idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), estimated in month
t − 1, into quintiles and compute the average value- and equal-weighted returns of each
20REG34 allows firms to remove themselves from the no-short list. These firms included AMB, JMP,
NITE, ACAP, GLRE, DHIL as of September 30. The AMEX compiled the list of firms that requested being
taken off the “no-short” list.
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quintile for the subsequent month. We form hedging portfolios (H−L) that are long the
highest and short the lowest IVOL quintiles and compute mean returns and alphas from the
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Results are presented in Table 2 for the full
sample period, 1963—2007, the period that we study IPO lockup expirations 1988—2007,
and the period that we study option introductions, 1996–2007.
For the full sample period the value-weighted return of the highest IVOL quintile un-
derperforms the lowest IVOL quintile by 0.95% per month (t = −2.94), which is similar in
magnitude to the 1.06% per month reported by Ang et al. (2006) for the period 1963—2001
and the 0.93% per month reported by Bali and Cakici (2007) for the period 1963—2004.
In contrast, the underperformance is absent for equal-weighted returns; the highest IVOL
quintile outperforms the lowest IVOL quintile by 0.05% per month (t = 0.15), which is
similar in magnitude to the 0.02% per month documented by Bali and Cakici. Consistent
with prior studies, the negative return differential of H−L is robust to controls for the Fama
and French (1993) three-factor model. Results for the two subperiods are similar to the
full period except that the value-weighted mean H−L return is insignificant for the period
1996–2007.
4.2 IPO lockup expiration and option introduction
We now turn to Hypothesis 1, which predicts that mitigation in the degree of short-sale
constraints from the IPO lockup expiration or the option introduction should strengthen
the negative volatility-return relation, at least in the short term. We examine the short-run
and long-run abnormal return performance of stocks with different idiosyncratic volatility
around and after the two events.
4.2.1 Return performance around and after events
Following Ofek and Richardson (2003) and others, we compute cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) for trading day intervals (−1, 1), (−3, 3) and (−10, 10) for the IPO sample, where
day 0 is the date of lockup expiration, and a daily abnormal return is defined as a stock’s
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return minus the CRSP value-weighted market index return.21 To examine the long-term
performance, we compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 12 calendar months
subsequent to the end of the IPO lockup period, where a BHAR is defined as the differ-
ence between the buy-and-hold return of the event stock and the buy-and-hold return on a
matched portfolio selected from 25 value-weighted size-BM portfolios.22 These benchmark
portfolios are formed each month.23 CARs and BHARs are both value- and equal-weighted.
We also form calendar time portfolios to examine the long-term performance of event firms.
We sort all event firms into quintiles according to an adjusted idiosyncratic volatility,
AIVOL, at the end of the month prior to the event, where AIVOL is defined as the difference
between IVOL and the equal-weighted IVOL across all available firms in a given month.
This adjustment is made to account for the upward time trend in idiosyncratic volatility, as
shown by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001).24 We then report the average CARs
or BHARs, for each of the five AIVOL quintiles, across the different event windows.
Relative to the lowest IVOL quintile, we expect the highest IVOL quintile to have worse
performance around and subsequent to the events, representing the correction of part of
the overpricing when short-sale constraints are relaxed. We report H−L portfolio returns
and the two-tailed bootstrapped t-values. The results are provided in Panel A of Table 3
for lockup expiration and in Panel B for option introduction. We plot in Figure 1, for the
lowest and highest AIVOL quintiles, both value- and equal-weighted BHARs through the 12
months subsequent to lockup expiration (Panel A) and option introduction (Panel B).
[INSERT TABLE 3 and FIGURE 1 HERE]
For the full IPO sample, the value-weighted CAR ranges from −1.57% to −2.78% for
the three event windows. Equal-weighted CARs are less negative. This is consistent with
21Similar results are obtained when we define CARs as the cumulative differences between stock returns
and the expected returns from a market model, or relative to the equal-weighted market index returns.
22The results are stronger using size-adjusted returns.
23The IPOs are matched with the benchmark portfolios according to the market cap for the month before
the lockup expiration. The stocks with option introduction are matched according to the market cap for the
most recent June.
24Subtracting the equal-weighted IVOL from firms’ IVOL eliminates the time trend in the aggregate IVOL.
However, subtracting the value-weighted IVOL does not.
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prior literature (Field and Hanka 2001, Bradley, Jordan, Yi, and Roten 2001, Brav and
Gompers 2003) that documents negative price reactions around −1% to −2% surrounding
the IPO lockup expiration. More importantly, we show that this value-weighted negative
price reaction is concentrated among the highest AIVOL quintile of IPOs.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, around and after the lockup period expiration the CAR
differentials between the highest and the lowest AIVOL quintiles of IPOs are all negative.
For example, for value-weighted CARs the range is from −1.89% to −13.09% for all three
intervals, and all are statistically significant at the 1% level. Equal-weighted CARs are
weaker, with values between −0.31% to −2.65%. This is consistent with observations that
equal-weighted high IVOL stocks do not significantly underperform on a regular basis.25
Thus, relaxation of short-sale constraints should have a much smaller effect on the volatility-
return relation among small stocks. Overall, we find that the value-weighted negative price
reaction is 1.71 to 4.47 times higher for the highest idiosyncratic volatility IPOs than for all
IPOs. This is a novel finding for IPO lockup expirations.
After the expiration the value-weighted and equal-weighted H−L BHARs are highly
negative and statistically significant.26 Over the 12-month period following the lockup ex-
piration, the BHAR is −21.34% (t = −4.78) for the value-weighted H−L portfolio and
−12.68% (t = −2.84) for the equal-weighted one. This evidence is again consistent with the
notion that highly volatile IPOs are more overpriced and the lockup expiration triggers the
long-term correction of overpricing.
For option introductions, we examine the CARs for intervals of (0, 20), (0, 40), and
(0, 60), where day 0 is the day the options first trade. We investigate event windows after
introduction because synthetic short-selling would not occur until options become available.27
25Consistent with Doran, Jiang, and Peterson (2008), we find that excluding January returns significantly
strengthens the underperformance of equal-weighted CARs on high AIVOL IPOs. For brevity, these results
are not reported here and available upon request.
26In unreported analyses we do not find substantial changes in IPO idiosyncratic volatility after the lockup
expiration. While we observe some regression-to-the-mean effect for idiosyncratic volatility, the rank based
on IVOL across firms remains relatively stable for at least 12 months after the lockup expiration.
27In contrast, some insider selling can occur a few days prior to lockup expiration because the lead
underwriters are allowed to release locked-up shares early (Brav and Gompers 2003).
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Results are similar to those for IPO lockup expirations. The stocks with option introductions
experience a value-weighted CAR between −0.10% and −2.18%. Again, the equal-weighted
CARs are less negative. The results are consistent with Danielsen and Sorescu (2001),
who find that after 1981, stocks with option introductions tend to underperform.28 More
importantly, we show that the negative price reactions are concentrated among the highest
AIVOL quintile of stocks; these stocks experience a value-weighted average CAR between
−1.48% and −9.93%, and all are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, value-weighted H−L CARs between the highest and lowest
AIVOL quintiles are negative and significant in all three event windows, with values between
−2.45% and −11.73%. Equal-weighted H−L CARs are closer to zero than value-weighted
CARs. H−L BHARs are negative and highly significant for both value and equal-weighted
returns. In sum, the negative price reaction among the highest AIVOL quintile is substan-
tially greater than the lowest AIVOL quintile and all stocks with option introductions.
Overall, our results are consistent with Hypothesis 1. For both the ending of the IPO
lockup period and option introduction, we find that high idiosyncratic volatility firms sub-
stantially underperform low volatility firms around and following these events. This suggests
that mitigation of short-sale constraints causes greater price corrections on more highly
volatile stocks. The long-term abnormal returns further confirm that high idiosyncratic
volatility stocks are more overpriced at the time of the event.
4.2.2 Stock and option trading volume
As Ofek and Richardson (2003) note, an IPO lockup represents an extreme form of short-sale
constraint because investors cannot sell their shares even when they hold a pessimistic view
of the stock. After the lockup period ends, we expect pessimistic shareholders to sell their
shares, causing a downward price correction and high abnormal trading volume, particularly
28It is worth noticing that the negative price reactions of all option introduction event stocks are mixed
in statistical significance. The results are stronger for value-weighted CARs and for longer event windows.
Therefore, whether option introductions reduce short-sale constraints of event stocks as a whole may be
subject to further debate (e.g. Mayhew and Mihov (2005) and Blau (2008)). But, the focus of the current
paper is the cross-sectional difference in price reactions across idiosyncratic volatility.
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on highly volatile stocks. Additionally, Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) show that
a portfolio that is short stocks with high short-sale constraints, proxied by the magnitude
of the violation of put-call parity, has a significantly positive alpha. While shorting these
stocks may not be possible, the introduction of options allows the creation of a synthetic
short position to form the position. Thus, our Hypothesis 2 suggests that we expect to
observe greater option trading volume on highly volatile stocks.
For each IPO, following Ofek and Richardson (2003), we measure excess trading volume
as the percentage change of the average daily turnover around the lockup expiration over
the trading day windows (−1, 1), (−3, 3), and (−10,10) from the average daily turnover
over a base period prior to the event (−60, −20). We expect the excess trading volume to
be positive and highly among high volatility stocks.
The abnormal trading volume measure is constructed differently for option volume for
two reasons. First, because no prior option volume exists, we cannot compute the change
in option volume relative to its historical level. Instead, we have to use a contemporaneous
benchmark. Second, prior research (e.g., Mayhew and Mihov (2004)) shows that option
volume is positively related to the volatility of underlying stocks. Thus, it is important to
control for the effect of volatility on option volume. We address the two issues by matching
the event stocks with a group of benchmark stocks with similar volatility and existing options.
Specifically, for each stock with an option introduction, we define the relative option volume
ratio as the ratio of the average daily option volume for that stock during the trading-day
windows (0, 20), (0, 40), and (0, 60) over the average daily option volume for a group of
benchmark stocks over the same window, where the benchmark group refers to all optionable
stocks with the same idiosyncratic volatility quintile rank that have options introduced at
least 36 months ago.29 We employ the same AIVOL quintiles as with returns and report
the value- and equal-weighted abnormal turnover across the AIVOL quintiles. We also
report H−L differences and their bootstrapped t-values. IPO lockup expirations and option
29The ranks are determined by the breakpoints using all stocks in a given month.
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introductions are in Panels A and B of Table 4, respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Similar to Field and Hanka (2001), we find positive excess trading volume, from 35%
to 66%, around the IPO lockup expiration. The excess trading volume is smaller when
the event window becomes wider, indicating that the excess trading is concentrated around
the event day. More importantly, in all cases the excess stock trading volume is greatest
among the highest AIVOL quintile of IPOs. All H−L abnormal volumes in Panel A are
positive. All are highly significant except for the IPOs for the two earlier periods with equal
weighting. In particular, for the event window (−10, 10), the value-weighted excess volume
of the highest AIVOL quintile is 66%, which is 40% higher than that of the lowest quintile,
26%. This abnormal turnover evidence, along with the prior return evidence, supports the
hypothesis that trading of highly volatile stocks responds more than that of low volatility
stocks surrounding the IPO lockup expiration.
The results for the option volume are similar to the findings following the ending of the
IPO lockup. The relative option volume ratio is highest for the highest AIVOL quintile,
especially when value-weighting. The H−L abnormal volumes in Panel B are all positive,
with significant value-weighted differences for all three periods. The only equally-weighted
differences that are significant are for the longest event window. The volume for all new
option introductions is less than the benchmark group, but does increase with time. As
Mayhew and Mihov (2004) posit, since exchanges choose options based on the anticipated
trading demand, the options that are listed earlier should have higher trading volume than
newly-listed ones. Our findings confirm this. More importantly, we find that the relative
option volume ratio is highest and the increase in trading volume is the largest among options
of highly volatile underlying stocks. For instance, with value-weighting, the highest AIVOL
quintile of stocks has a relative option volume ratio of 0.31, 0.78, and 0.93 over the three
event windows, while the three numbers are 0.09, 0.11, and 0.12 for the lowest quintile, with
the differences highly significant (t-statistics greater than 9).
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In other words, controlling for the effect of volatility on option volume, the options on the
most volatile stocks are almost eight times higher than on the least volatile stocks. Overall,
consistent with Hypothesis 2, our evidence suggests that if option introductions depress stock
returns and increase option trading volume through allowing synthetic short selling, then
these effects are most prominent among highly volatile stocks.
4.2.3 Calendar-time portfolios
Schultz (2003) shows that the results from BHARs can be misleading if there is a pseudo mar-
ket timing issue. Fama (1998) argues that the calendar-time portfolio methodology provides
better test statistics for long-run abnormal return estimates than the BHAR methodology.30
To assess the robustness of our long-run performance results, we form calendar-time port-
folios that include firms that have the IPO lockup period end or options introduced in the
prior 36 months.31 In each month we sort stocks that have events occurring in the most
recent 36 months into terciles based on their IVOL measured at the end of the prior month,
and then compute both value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolio returns. We examine
whether highly volatile IPOs underperform more subsequent to the lockup expiration and
whether highly volatile option introduction firms underperform more subsequent to option
introduction. To fully explore profitable trading strategies, we exclude January returns be-
cause the volatility-return relation is reversed, driving returns in the opposite direction of
our strategy.32 In Table 5 we report the results of regressing the excess monthly returns for
each tercile and the H−L portfolios on the Fama and French (1993) three factors. IPO firms
are in Panel A and option introduction firms are in Panel B. We expect the intercepts of the
highest IVOL portfolios and those of the H−L portfolios will be negative.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
30Loughran and Ritter (2000), however, suggest that when misvaluation is time-varying, the calendar-time
portfolio approach may reduce the power to detect misvaluation.
31We choose to report the results based on 36-month long-run performance because the long horizon
ensures that each IVOL portfolio is well-diversified. The results based on 24-month or 60-month long-run
performances are qualitatively similar.
32The negative H−L alphas remain after including January months, but not they are not statistically
significant except for the value-weighted IPOs.
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There is strong evidence for the underperformance of highly volatile stocks subsequent
to the expiration of the IPO lockup period and the introduction of options. The intercepts
of the highest IVOL tercile are negative and highly significant, as are the intercepts of the
H−L portfolios. Monthly Fama and French (1993) alphas are approximately 1% following
option introduction and range from 1% to almost 2% for IPO lockup expiration. Thus, the
abnormal returns are both economically and statistically significant. Compared to all IPOs
or stocks with option introductions, the alphas on the highest IVOL group are substantially
(one and one-half to eight times) larger. For example, value-weighted all IPOs produce an
alpha of −0.20%, while the highest IVOL group has an alpha of −1.57%. Similarly, with
value weighting the highest IVOL stocks with option introductions yield an alpha that is over
three times higher than for all stocks with option introductions. These results are consistent
with the findings for BHARs in Table 3 and imply profitable trading strategies.
4.3 Short-sale ban on financial firms
Finally, we test the price reactions to the short-sale ban enforcement and subsequent expi-
ration in 2008. For each stock in our sample, average daily returns are calculated for the
two-day announcement window, September 18th and 19th, the subsequent thirteen days the
ban was enforced, and the day after the ban expiration, October 9th. A two-day window for
the ban enforcement is used because of the initial issuance by the SEC to limit naked short
sales on September 18th at 12:01 am, the FSA ban of British financials on the same day, and
the actual ban on the 799 financial firms was enacted at the close on September 18th.
Similar to the end of the IPO lockup period and the option introduction, IVOL is calcu-
lated using a Fama-French three-factor model with at least 17 daily returns over the window
(−41, −11), where day 0 is September 18th. We then sort all event firms into quintiles
according to IVOL. Based on Hypothesis 3, we expect that the highest IVOL firms will
significantly outperform the lowest IVOL firms on the two days of the ban enforcement, and
significantly underperform on the day of the expiration of the ban. We calculate returns for
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each quintile and for the H−L difference. Bootstrapped t-values are presented for the H−L
returns. The results are reported in Table 6, Panel A, and plotted in Figure 2.
[INSERT TABLE 6 AND FIGURE 2]
Consistent with the idea of a downward-sloping demand curve, the enforcement of the
short-sale ban causes an instant upward price move. The value-weighted two-day return is
17.16% and the equal-weighted return is 17.34% (the return is similar for each of the two
days), suggesting substantial price impacts by removing short sellers from our sample firms.
In contrast, the lifting of the ban causes a negative price impact, −5.12% for value-weighted
and −10.69% for equal-weighted returns. During the window when the ban is effective, the
cumulative return on our sample firms is more negative (over −20%), which reflects the
deteriorating fundamentals and worsening uncertainty of the macro-economic environment
of that period.33
Supporting our Hypothesis 3, on the two days of the ban, the value and equal-weighted
H−L returns are 14.08% and 8.81%, respectively, and both are statistically significant. The
value and equal-weighted H−L returns on the day after the expiration of the ban are −4.65%
and −0.22%, respectively, and the former is statistically significant. The H−L returns are
insignificant in the middle period, implying that the differing effect of the ban across volatility
groups is only temporary.
Next, we test whether short sellers targeted highly volatile (thus, more overpriced) stocks
before and after the short-sale ban. The purpose is to provide evidence that the short-sale
ban causes greater price impacts by removing more short positions off the market. Based
on Hypothesis 3, we expect the highest IVOL quintile to have a greater short interest ratio
than the lowest quintile prior to the ban enforcement and after the ban expiration.
33The results are similar to the overall performance of financial stocks during these windows. For instance,
the financial sector ETF, XLF, experienced returns of 20.65%, −30.38%, and −12.13% in the three windows,
respectively. The results are also consistent with the media consensus that the short-sale ban failed to stop
price declines on financial stocks. Even SEC Chairman Christopher Cox publicly acknowledged that the
biggest mistake of his tenure was agreeing in September to an extraordinary three-week ban on short selling
of financial company stocks and that this ban was not productive. See “SEC Chief Defends His Restraint,”
by Amit R Paley and David S. Hilzenrath, Washington Post, December 24, 2008.
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Short interest data are released twice a month on scheduled dates at 4:30 pm Eastern
Time for NASDAQ stocks and by midnight for NYSE and AMEX stocks. The required report
dates, settlement dates, and trade dates are usually a few days earlier than the release dates,
with the trade dates earliest among the three. Since we are interested in the actual short
positions taken prior to September 18th and after October 9th, we choose to report the data
on the latest trade date prior to the ban enforcement, September 10th (which is released on
the 24th), and the earliest trade date following the ban expiration, October 9th (which is
released on November 11)th. Since the later trade date coincides with the date of the ban
expiration, we also report the short interest ratios on October 28th (with the release date
November 11th) to account for the possibility that short positions taken on October 9th are
reported in the later date. We report the percentage short interest ratios for all event stocks
and across the IVOL quintiles in Panel B of Table 6, together with the test of the H−L
differences.
The evidence in Panel B strongly supports Hypothesis 3 that short positions are heavily
taken on volatile, particularly large-cap, stocks. All H−L short interest ratios are positive
and they are highly significant for value-weighted results; the short interest ratio of the
highest IVOL quintile is on average five times of that of the lowest quintile. For instance,
as of September 10th prior to the ban, the value-weighted short interest ratio is 15% in
the highest IVOL quintile but only 3.09% in the lowest quintile. These two numbers are
11.77% and 2.17%, respectively, on October 9th, right after the ban was lifted. This pattern
persists on October 28th. Equal-weighted results are weak, which is consistent with our
return findings: the differential price impacts across IVOL groups are concentrated among
large firms. Overall, these results on the enforcement and expiration of ban are consistent
with our hypothesis and demonstrate that the effect of short-sale constraints contributes to
the negative volatility-return relation.
23
5 Summary and Conclusion
Through the use of event studies, we provide novel evidence showing that relaxing or
strengthening of short-sale constraints affects the negative volatility-return relation. When
short-selling constraints are mitigated at the end of the IPO lockup period, highly volatile
stocks experience a substantially worse short-run and long-run abnormal performance than
low volatility stocks. Similar results are found for stocks with option introductions. The ab-
normal returns associated with high idiosyncratic volatility stocks are much more negative
than those previously documented for all event stocks. Evidence from stock trading volume
surrounding the IPO unlock-up and option trading volume following option introductions
reveal significant more trading activities associated with high idiosyncratic volatility stocks.
We further show that during the short-sale ban of 2008, the importance of short-sale
constraints on the temporary pricing of financial firms from September 18th through October
9th. When the short sale ban was enforced, higher volatility stocks experienced stronger
temporary price appreciation than lower volatility stocks; when the ban expired, the reverse
held. Highly volatile stocks are heavily shorted prior to the ban and after the ban expiration.
Overall, our evidence suggests that short-sale constraints play an important role in the
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. It is worth remarking that our evidence does not identify
whether binding short-sale constraints are the only source of overpricing of high idiosyncratic
volatility. As suggested by prior theoretic work, both divergent investor beliefs and limits
of arbitrage jointly determine asset mispricing. Short-sale constraints are only one form
of such barriers to arbitrage. Our results only show that the extent to which short-sale
constraints worsen the overpricing of highly volatile firms relative that of the less volatile
firms is economically and statistically significant. As a result, reducing the barriers to short
selling should enhance the efficiency of pricing high volatility stocks in the market.
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Table 1. Summary statistics  
 
This table reports, in Panel A, the summary statistics of firm idiosyncratic volatility 
of returns (IVOL),  logarithmic firm size (LOGME), and book‐to‐market equity (BM) 
for  firms over  the period 1963―2007, and  two sub‐periods.    IVOL  is  the  standard 
deviation of daily residual returns from regressing 17 or more daily returns during 
the prior month on the Fama‐French three factors. IVOLs equal to zero are excluded.  
LOGME  is  the  logarithmic market equity at  the end of  the prior month.   BM  is  the 
book equity over market equity, where book equity  is measured at the fiscal year‐
end  through  December  of  year  s‐1  and  market  equity  is  measured  at  the  end  of 
December of year s‐1 for BM from July of year s through June of year s+1. Firms with 
IPO  lockup  expirations  refer  to  event  IPOs  with  lockup  expiration  dates  in  the 
sample 1988―2007. Firms with option introduction refer to event firms with option 
introduced  over  the  period  1996―2007.  The  short‐sale  ban  sample  includes  the 
stocks on the ban list that have trading volume of at least 1000 shares for each of the 
three event days (September 18th, 19th, and October 9th) and a price of at least $2.50 
on  September  18th.    Panel  B  provides  descriptive  statistics  for  the  number  of  IPO 
lockup days.  
 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
  
Number of 
Firms  IVOL  LOGME  BM 
Full Sample  22104  3.52  3.79  0.74 
1988―2007  15937  3.94  4.30  0.63 
1996―2007  11924  3.83  4.90  0.62 
IPO Lockup  Expiration (1988―2007)  4128  3.94  4.75  0.35 
Option Introduction (1996―2007)  3034  3.57  6.26  0.47 
Short‐Sale Ban (September — October, 2008)  542  2.18  5.84  N/A 
Panel B: IPO lockup days 
   Mean  Median  Min  Max 
IPO Lockup  Expiration  210  180  45  1095
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Table 3. Cumulative and buy­and­hold abnormal returns around mitigation of 
short­sale constraints  
 
This  table  reports  the  percentage  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  and  buy‐
and‐hold  abnormal  returns  (BHARs)  of  idiosyncratic  volatility  quintiles  following 
the  expiration  of  the  IPO  lockup  period  from  1988―2007  (Panel  A)  and  option 
introduction  from  1996―2007  (Panel  B).  Day  0  refers  to  the  date  of  the  lockup 
expiration  or  the  day when options  of  a  stock  first  appear  in OptionMetrics.  If  an 
expiration day falls on a weekend or holiday, the immediately following trading day 
is  defined  as  the  expiration  day.      CAR  is  defined  as  the  cumulative  daily  return 
difference between the event firm and the value‐weighted CRSP market portfolio. A 
BHAR is the difference between the buy‐and‐hold returns of the event  firms and a 
matched  benchmark  portfolio.  Using  NYSE  breakpoints,  25  value‐weighted 
benchmark  portfolios  are  formed  each  month  from  independently  sorting  stocks 
into five firm size (measured at the end of the most recent June) and book‐to‐market 
equity (BM) portfolios. BM is defined in Table 1.   In Panel A, size is matched at the 
end  of  the  month  prior  to  the  event.    In  Panel  B,  size  is  matched  at  the  end  of 
December  of  the  year  prior  to  the  event.  The  adjusted  idiosyncratic  volatility 
(AIVOL)  is  the  difference  between  idiosyncratic  volatility  and  the  equal‐weighted 
idiosyncratic volatility of all available firms, formed to account for the time trend in 
idiosyncratic volatility. Bootstrapped t‐statistics are reported in italics.  
 
Panel A: IPO lockup expiration  
 
 
CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-3,+3) CAR (-10,+10) 12-month BHAR 
AIVOL VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW 
All -1.57 -1.35 -1.87 -1.62 -2.78 -2.06 -1.32 -1.05 
L (low) -0.79 -0.82 0.01 -0.77 0.66 -0.52 1.12 3.46 
2 -0.78 -1.09 -0.03 -1.51 -0.60 -1.21 8.20 5.25 
3 -1.68 -1.55 -2.41 -1.91 -1.92 -1.98 0.78 -0.87 
4 -2.35 -2.17 -2.96 -2.76 -2.74 -3.42 -2.63 -3.87 
H (high) -2.69 -1.13 -5.22 -1.16 -12.43 -3.16 -20.22 -9.22 
H-L -1.89 -0.31 -5.22 -0.40 -13.09 -2.65 -21.34 -12.68 
 -3.76 -0.62 -7.70 -0.58 -11.89 -2.39 -4.78 -2.84 
Obs 4106 4122 4127 4001 
Panel B: Option introduction  
 
 
CAR (0,+20) CAR (0,+40) CAR (0,+60) 12-month BHAR 
AIVOL VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW 
All -0.10 -0.03 -0.73 -0.31 -2.18 -0.51 -3.48 -1.76 
L (low) 0.97 0.25 1.46 0.00 1.80 -0.27 5.29 2.39 
2 1.33 0.07 2.21 -0.53 0.44 -0.92 5.61 0.76 
3 -1.92 -0.62 -1.69 -1.52 -2.73 -1.10 -6.77 -1.01 
4 -0.13 0.40 0.37 0.44 -2.40 1.02 -1.51 -0.75 
H (high) -1.48 -0.25 -6.96 0.08 -9.93 -1.26 -23.85 -10.19 
H-L -2.45 -0.50 -8.42 0.08 -11.73 -0.99 -29.14 -12.58 
 -2.04 -0.41 -5.07 0.04 -6.34 -0.53 -5.82 -2.57 
Obs 2747 2719 2719 2614 
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Table 4. Abnormal trading volume around mitigation of short­sale constraints 
 
This table reports the average daily excess trading volume of idiosyncratic volatility 
quintiles of stocks  following the expiration of  the  IPO  lockup period (Panel A) and 
daily  relative  option  volume  ratio  following  option  introduction  (Panel  B).  The 
abnormal  volumes  are  both  value‐weighted  (VW)  and  equal‐weighted  (EW).  In 
Panel A, excess trading volume is defined as the change of daily turnover for a given 
stock over the event window from that over the pre‐event window. The pre‐event 
window  is  defined  as  trading  days  from  ‐60  through  ‐20  prior  to  the  event.  The 
event windows include trading days from ‐1 (or ‐3, ‐10) through trading day 1 (or 3, 
10). In Panel B, the relative option volume ratio is defined as the ratio of the average 
daily total option volume for a given event stock over the three event windows over 
the average option volume for a group of benchmark stocks on the same day, where 
the  benchmark  group  refers  to  all  optionable  stocks  with  the  same  idiosyncratic 
volatility  quintile  rank  that  have  options  introduced  at  least  36  months  ago.  
Average bootstrapped t‐statistics are reported in italics below the mean difference 
in excess volume between the highest and lowest AIVOL quintiles (H‐L).   
 
Panel A: Excess trading volume around IPO lockup expiration  
 
 
 (-1,1) (-3,3) (-10,10) 
AIVOL VW EW VW EW VW EW 
All 0.66 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.39 0.35 
L (low) 0.55 0.41 0.42 0.36 0.26 0.27 
2 0.45 0.48 0.37 0.40 0.24 0.28 
3 0.68 0.62 0.51 0.50 0.45 0.37 
4 0.79 0.57 0.56 0.47 0.43 0.38 
H (high) 0.96 0.62 0.79 0.55 0.66 0.46 
H-L 0.41 0.21 0.37 0.19 0.40 0.19 
 3.18 1.60 3.38 1.76 5.63 2.66 
Obs 4127 4127 4127 
Panel B: Relative option volume ratio following option introduction  
 
 
(0,20)  (0,40)  (0,60) 
AIVOL VW EW VW EW VW EW 
All 0.17 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.40 0.24 
L (low) 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.18 
2 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.16 
3 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.19 
4 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.17 
H (high) 0.31 0.21 0.78 0.41 0.93 0.48 
H-L 0.22 0.09 0.67 0.24 0.81 0.30 
 9.58 1.18 12.14 1.88 12.33 2.14 
Obs 2747 2719 2719 
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Table 5: Calendar  time portfolios based on  the  IPO  lockup period expiration 
and option introduction 
  
This  table reports  the  time‐series regression results of  the calendar  time portfolio 
returns  on  the  Fama‐French  three‐factors  (MKT,  SMB,  and  HML),  with  January 
returns excluded. The portfolios  include stocks  following  the expiration of  the  IPO 
lockup period (Panel A) or option introduction (Panel B).  Porfolio “All” includes all 
event stocks. In each month, stocks with either of the two events occurring during 
the  past  36  months  are  sorted  according  to  idiosyncratic  volatility  (IVOL)  into 
terciles, labeled as “L”, “M”, and “H.” H‐L refers to high minus low terciles. The event 
month  returns  are  excluded.  Both  value‐weighted  and  equal‐weighted  portfolio 
returns  are  computed.  Robust Newey‐West  (1987)  t‐statistics  are  reported  below 
the coefficients in italics. R‐squares are adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
  
 
Value‐weighted  Equal‐weighted 
Panel A: IPO lockup expiration 
IVOL  Intercept  MKT  SMB HML  R2   Intercept  MKT  SMB  HML  R2 
All  ‐0.20  1.32  0.80 ‐0.66 90% ‐0.69 1.33  0.97  ‐0.06 84%
  ­1.07  20.27  11.32 ­7.12  ­3.32 14.93  7.11  ­0.47  
L (low)  0.36  1.14  0.45 ‐0.39 80%   ‐0.11 1.11  0.69  0.24 80%
  1.65  18.94  6.70 ­4.73     ­0.59 21.74  12.09  3.45  
M  ‐0.28  1.52  0.94 ‐0.76 86%   ‐0.45 1.34  0.97  ‐0.21 85%
  ­1.01  20.14  11.19 ­7.27     ­1.94 21.17  13.78  ­2.38  
H (high)  ‐1.57  1.66  1.10 ‐0.76 82%   ‐1.11 1.47  1.16  ‐0.24 74%
  ­4.58  17.65  10.50 ­5.82     ­3.05 14.73  10.44  ­1.72  
H‐L  ‐1.94  0.52  0.65 ‐0.36 38%   ‐1.00 0.36  0.47  ‐0.48 34%
  ­4.93  4.82  5.43 ­2.44     ­2.81 3.68  4.35  ­3.58  
Panel B: Option introduction 
IVOL  Intercept  MKT  SMB HML  R2   Intercept  MKT  SMB  HML  R2 
All  ‐0.28  1.29  0.69 ‐0.62 92% ‐0.65 1.51  0.88  ‐0.11 91%
  ­1.43  15.17  7.79 ­5.85   ­2.52 17.64  7.69  ­0.93  
L (low)  0.18  0.99  0.24 0.27 78%   ‐0.09 1.06  0.40  0.60 85%
  0.90  19.09  4.39 3.90     ­0.51 24.36  8.92  10.21  
M  ‐0.48  1.34  0.67 ‐0.58 88%   ‐0.55 1.39  0.80  ‐0.09 91%
  ­1.61  17.85  8.58 ­5.78     ­2.33 23.28  12.88  ­1.17  
H (high)  ‐0.88  1.85  0.90 ‐0.88 87%   ‐1.16 1.81  1.09  ‐0.50 86%
  ­1.96  16.34  7.70 ­5.76     ­2.68 16.59  9.64  ­3.39  
H‐L  ‐1.06  0.86  0.67 ‐1.15 73%    ‐1.07 0.75  0.69  ‐1.10 73%
   ­2.15  6.89  5.16 ­6.87      ­2.33 6.45  5.72  ­7.04   
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Table 6: Returns and short interest ratios of portfolio sorted on idiosyncratic 
volatility upon the short­sale ban and its expiration 
 
Panel  A  reports  the  average  cumulative  returns  over  three  event  windows  of  all 
sample  firms  and  the  quintiles  sorted  on  idiosyncratic  volatility  (IVOL)  for  the 
financial firms that are in the initial SEC list to ban short selling. On September 18th, 
stocks  are  sorted  into  quintiles  based  on  IVOL  that  is  computed  as  described  in 
Table 1 using no less than 17 daily returns from day ‐41 through ‐11, where day 0 
refers to 9/18/2008. We first compute the cumulative returns over each window for 
each  stock  and  then  take  the  average  across  quintiles.  Both  value‐  and  equal‐
weighted  (VW  and  EW,  respectively)  portfolio  returns  are  reported  in  percent.  
Panel B  reports  the  average  short  interest  ratio  across  all  and quintiles  of  stocks. 
The short interest ratio is defined as the number of shares shorted over the shares 
outstanding  and  reported  in  percent.  The  release  dates  of  the  short  interests  are 
listed under each window. Bootstrapped t‐statistics are reported in italics based on 
bootstrapped standard errors.  
 
Panel A: Cumulative Returns 
   Enforcement  Ban Effective  Expiration 
  
September 18th and 
19th  
September 20th –October 
8th  October 9th 
IVOLt‐1 Rank  VW  EW  VW  EW  VW  EW 
All  17.16  17.34  ‐20.34  ‐22.40  ‐5.12  ‐10.69 
L (low)  12.33  11.94  ‐21.37  ‐21.63  ‐8.97  ‐9.96 
2  17.11  15.35  ‐19.91  ‐20.95  ‐4.36  ‐10.40 
3  23.44  19.16  ‐30.18  ‐24.54  ‐11.96  ‐11.90 
4  23.60  19.50  ‐21.00  ‐22.43  ‐9.39  ‐11.01 
H (high)  26.41  20.75  ‐23.51  ‐22.47  ‐13.62  ‐10.19 
H–L  14.08  8.81  ‐2.14  ‐0.84  ‐4.65  ‐0.22 
    5.99  3.75   ­1.06   ­0.423  ­ 3.34  ­0 .17 
Panel B: Short Interest Ratio 
   Enforcement  Expiration  Post‐Expiration 
   September 10th  October 9th  October 28th 
IVOLt‐1 Rank  VW  EW  VW  EW  VW  EW 
All  7.56  6.77  5.54  4.76  5.07  4.49 
L (low)  3.09  5.16  2.17  3.37  2.29  3.54 
2  8.50  6.40  6.09  4.69  5.47  4.33 
3  6.73  7.17  5.38  5.00  4.85  4.56 
4  5.50  7.60  4.00  5.47  3.86  5.09 
H (high)  15.00  7.48  11.77  5.22  10.64  4.89 
H–L  11.92  2.31  9.61  1.85  8.35  1.35 
    7.84   1.51   8.98   1.82   9.23   1.49 
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Figure 1: Long­run performance of idiosyncratic volatility portfolios after 
mitigation of short­sale constraints 
 
This figure plots the buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of the highest  (H) and 
the  lowest  (L)  quintiles,    sorted  on  adjusted  idiosyncratic  volatility  (AIVOL),  from 
one through twelve months subsequent to the end of the IPO lockup (Panel A) and 
option introduction (Panel B). The value‐weighted BHARs (VW) are represented by 
solid  lines and the equal‐weighted BHARs (EW) by dotted  lines. The definitions of 
AIVOL, BHARs, and the events are in Table 3. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative returns of portfolios based on idiosyncratic volatility 
following the short­sale ban 
 
The  figures  plot  returns  of  the  highest  (H)  and  lowest  (L)  idiosyncratic  volatility 
quintiles over the window of the short‐sale ban. The figure plots the value‐weighted 
cumulative  percentage  returns  for  the  two  day  window  9/18/2008―9/19/2008 
(short‐sale  ban  enforcement),  the  13‐day  window  9/22/2008―10/08/2008  (no 
restriction)  and  the  one‐day  window  10/9/2008  (short‐sale  ban  expiration).  
Idiosyncratic  volatility  (IVOL)  is  the  standard  deviation  of  daily  residual  returns 
from regressing 17 or more daily returns from day t‐41 through t‐11, where t refers 
to 9/18/2008.   
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